The Federal Aviation Administration warns that GNSS interference, including jamming and spoofing, poses severe risks to aviation operations, potentially disrupting entire airports. Updated guidance in the FAA’s GPS/GNSS Interference Resource Guide Version 1.1 details how such disruptions degrade critical systems reliant on satellite position and timing data.
Interference can disable RNAV/RNP navigation, ADS-B surveillance, CPDLC communications, automatic navaid tuning, synthetic vision, HUDs, and TAWS terrain avoidance systems. Pilots may observe signs like sudden position jumps, time shifts, moving-map anomalies, or false terrain warnings. Spoofing effects can persist after leaving affected areas, necessitating cross-checks with non-GNSS sources and ground-based approaches.
Real-world incidents underscore the threat. At Denver International Airport, an unauthorized transmitter caused multiple aircraft to report unreliable GNSS, impacting flights, air traffic control, and GNSS-dependent systems. Dallas experienced significant disruptions from interference, leading to aircraft rerouting. Unintentional sources, such as faulty commercial equipment or reradiated signals from avionic repair shops near airports, have also triggered widespread issues in the U.S.
Globally, interference has surged, with a 65% increase in GNSS loss per 1,000 flights in early 2024 compared to 2023, per IATA data. Hotspots include the Eastern Mediterranean, Black Sea, Russia-Baltic region, India-Pakistan border, Iraq-Iran, Korean peninsula, and areas around Beijing. High workloads from diagnosing issues, switching backups, and rerouting elevate error risks and reduce safety margins.
The FAA mandates immediate ATC reports of suspected jamming or spoofing, followed by written anomaly reports post-landing, to track and mitigate these growing threats.